Why Revenue Sharing Dollars/NIL is Likely to Fall Under Title IX Rules in College Sports (Eventually)
"This is a free-market system—NIL is about athletes making what they’re worth. Title IX doesn’t apply to business transactions." – a prominent local sportswriter/broadcaster
As legendary football pundit Lee Corso would say, "Not so fast, my friend."
The evolving landscape of college athletics—particularly Name, Image, and Likeness (NIL) revenue-sharing agreements—has raised serious questions about gender equity and Title IX compliance. While some argue that NIL earnings are a function of the free market and, therefore, not subject to Title IX, the reality is far more complex.
The cobwebs from my brain are being cleared away. Back in the last century, the implementation of Title IX in college athletics was my final research and writing requirement (dissertation) for law school. I lectured to groups on the subject. And this issue is coming back around.
Bottomline--- I believe that if institutions receive and distribute NIL-related revenue to athletes, those payments will more likely than not fall under Title IX regulations—just like scholarships, athletic budgets, and other university-controlled benefits.
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 is a federal law that prohibits sex-based discrimination in any educational program or activity receiving federal funding, including college athletics. It mandates equal opportunities, treatment, and benefits for male and female student-athletes.
While many associate Title IX with participation numbers (such as ensuring roughly equal opportunities in men’s and women’s sports), the law also applies to scholarships, facilities, coaching, travel budgets, and other resources controlled by universities.
Over the years, Title IX has been the basis for lawsuits against schools that fail to provide female athletes with equitable treatment in funding, media exposure, and resources. Now, as revenue-sharing becomes part of the NCAA model, a critical question emerges: if universities control NIL-related revenue distributions, will those funds also be subject to Title IX?
Why do I believe that Name, Image, and Likeness (NIL) revenue-sharing agreements will be part of the Title IX adherence? Several reasons.
Universities as the Distributors of Funds - The key factor in Title IX compliance isn’t where the money originates—it’s whether the school controls how it’s distributed. Scholarships and stipends for student-athletes, for example, are subject to Title IX because they are university-controlled benefits.
If universities collect NIL revenue through media rights, conference distributions, or other shared agreements and then allocate those funds to student-athletes, those payments would likely be subject to the same gender equity requirements as scholarships and financial aid.
Precedent in Financial Aid & Scholarships - Title IX applies to all financial benefits provided by a school to its students. That includes academic and athletic scholarships, housing stipends, and cost-of-attendance payments. If schools start distributing revenue from NIL-related deals to athletes, it will be difficult to argue that those funds don’t fall under similar regulations.
Unequal Distribution Could Invite Legal Challenges - Without Title IX oversight, a revenue-sharing model could skew heavily toward male-dominated sports like football and basketball. Historically, those sports generate the bulk of revenue, and schools could be tempted to distribute funds primarily to those athletes.
However, a system where male athletes receive substantially more NIL-based revenue than female athletes—especially when the school is facilitating those payments—could result in lawsuits arguing that Title IX requires an equitable distribution model. Courts have consistently ruled that universities cannot disproportionately allocate resources to male athletes, even if more revenue is generated from men’s sports.
Athletic Departments Are Not Separate from Universities - A common argument against Title IX applying to NIL revenue is that these earnings are "outside" the university’s control. However, if schools act as intermediaries for NIL funds—just as they do with scholarship money—Title IX will almost certainly apply.
Athletic departments, despite their financial independence in some cases, are still part of their respective universities. They receive federal funding and are subject to Title IX regulations. If revenue-sharing payments are routed through athletic departments, they become institutionally controlled benefits, and universities will be expected to ensure equitable distribution.
The introduction of NIL revenue-sharing is a major shift in college athletics, but it doesn’t exist in a legal vacuum. Schools can’t pick and choose which financial benefits fall under Title IX compliance and which do not. If institutions receive, manage, and distribute NIL-related revenue, they will almost certainly be required to ensure those funds are distributed equitably across men’s and women’s sports.
Could I be wrong? Absolutely. But I don’t think so. In the case that made all of this a discussion (NCAA vs. Alton), the Supreme Court (in a 9- 0 decision) made it clear that legal principles—not the traditions or financial concerns of college sports—take precedence in its rulings. Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s concurring opinion left no doubt about this when he stated, "Nowhere else in America can businesses get away with agreeing not to pay their workers a fair market rate on the theory that their product is defined by not paying their workers a fair market rate." This reasoning signals that the Court is unlikely to concern itself with how revenue-sharing impacts the structure of college athletics. If universities receive and distribute NIL-related payments, Title IX’s legal requirements will almost certainly apply, regardless of how schools or the NCAA believe it will affect competitive balance or athletic departments. Just as the Court dismissed arguments that protecting amateurism justified wage restrictions, it will likely dismiss concerns that Title IX compliance would disrupt revenue-sharing models. The Constitution and federal law override the operational challenges of college sports, and if revenue distribution disproportionately benefits male athletes, legal action will follow.
How does this change to “compensation,” aimed to happen in mid-summer 2025, differ legal under Title IX from what is happening today? Under the current NIL model, where independent collectives—rather than universities—facilitate and distribute payments to student-athletes, Title IX is far less likely to apply. The key distinction lies in institutional control. Title IX governs educational institutions that receive federal funding, ensuring gender equity in benefits and opportunities provided directly by the school. However, most NIL deals today are brokered by third-party entities—booster-led collectives or private companies—operating outside the university's legal and financial framework. Since these collectives negotiate directly with athletes and distribute compensation based on market forces rather than institutional policies, universities have little direct involvement in the transactions. As a result, these payments are not considered "educational benefits" or "university-controlled resources" subject to Title IX oversight. While disparities in NIL earnings between male and female athletes may raise ethical concerns, they do not automatically create a legal obligation under Title IX unless the university itself is receiving, managing, or distributing the funds. Thus, as long as collectives—not schools—remain the primary facilitators of NIL compensation, the argument for Title IX applicability remains significantly weaker.
Universities and athletic conferences should be proactive in preparing for this. If they fail to design fair and equitable NIL revenue-sharing policies, they may soon find themselves defending lawsuits—and history suggests those lawsuits will favor Title IX enforcement.
In other words: if schools control the money, Title IX applies. It’s not a matter of if—but when—the courts confirm this reality.
